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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                         
 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
         Appellants, residents of New Jersey who currently 
receive welfare funding through the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children ("AFDC") program, challenge the exercise by 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("HHS") of her 
authority pursuant to section 1115 of the Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 1315(a) ("section 1315(a)"), which permits her to waive 
requirements for state plans under the Act to enable individual 
states to test reforms to their AFDC programs through 
"demonstration projects."  Specifically, appellants challenge the 
Secretary's grant of waivers to the State of New Jersey in July 
1992 to allow implementation of the state's Family Development 
Program ("FDP") which, inter alia, contains the so-called "Family 
Cap" provision, an amendment to existing state law that 
eliminates the standard increase provided by AFDC for any child 
born to a woman currently receiving AFDC.  
         Appellants claim that the Secretary's waiver was 
invalid and improper, that the FDP violates a number of federal 
statutes and regulations, and that it violates their 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.  Both 
the appellants and the state and federal appellees moved for 
summary judgment in the district court on all legal issues.  The 
court granted summary judgment for appellees on all counts and 
dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. 
Supp. 991 (D.N.J. 1995).  This appeal followed. 
         The district court had jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3).  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the matter is plenary.  
Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1995); Mellon 
Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 642 (3d 
Cir. 1991). 
 
                      I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
                    A.  STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
         AFDC is a joint federal and state program established 
under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et 
seq., to "enabl[e] each State to furnish financial assistance and 
rehabilitation and other services, as far as practicable under 
the conditions in such State, to needy dependent children and the 
parents or relatives with whom they are living . . . ."  42 
U.S.C. § 601.  Under the program, if a state submits an AFDC plan 
that meets the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 602, the federal 
government will reimburse it for a portion of the benefits it 
provides to aid recipients.  In other words, the state will 
receive federal matching funds if it implements an AFDC plan that 
comports fully with the Social Security Act. 
         AFDC is a "scheme of cooperative federalism" in which 
states are given "considerable latitude" in the administration of 
their own programs.  King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316-19, 88 
S.Ct. 2128, 2133-34 (1968).  Within the statute itself, Congress 
authorized financial aid: 
         [f]or the purpose of encouraging the care of 
         dependent children in their own homes or in 
         the homes of relatives by enabling each State 
         to furnish financial assistance and 
         rehabilitation and other services, as far as 
         practicable under the conditions in such 
         State, to needy dependent children and the 
         parents or relatives with whom they are 
         living to help maintain and strengthen family 
         life and to help such parents or relatives to 
         attain or retain capability for the maximum 
         self-support and personal independence 
         consistent with the maintenance of continuing 
         parental care and protection . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 601. 
         In 1962, Congress added section 1115 of the Social 
Security Act, now 42 U.S.C. § 1315, in the Public Welfare 
Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, 76 Stat. 192 (1962).  
Section 1315 provides, in relevant part: 
              In the case of any experimental, pilot, 
         or demonstration project which, in the 
         judgment of the Secretary, is likely to 
         assist in promoting the objectives of 
         subchapter I, X, XIV, XVI, or XIX of this 
         chapter, or Part A or D of subchapter IV of 
         this chapter, in a State or States-- 
 
              (1) the Secretary may waive 
              compliance with any of the 
              requirements of section 302, 602, 
              654, 1202, 1352, 1382, or 1396a of 
              this title, as the case may be, to 
              the extent and for the period he 
              finds necessary to enable such 
              State or States to carry out such 
              project . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1315(a). 
         New Jersey's AFDC program is administered by the 
state's Department of Human Services ("DHS").  On July 1, 1992, 
the New Jersey legislature enacted the Family Development 
Program, now known as the Family Development Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 44:10-19 to -33, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 44:10-3.3 to -3.8 (West 
1993).  The FDP aims to reduce welfare dependency by, inter alia, 
developing educational and vocational skills.  To advance these 
goals, one aspect of the FDP mandates that implementing state and 
county agencies provide individual recipients with contracts 
tailored to the individuals' needs, providing the recipients with 
such services as: 
         job development and placement in full-time 
         permanent jobs . . . counseling and 
         vocational assessment; intensive remedial 
         education, including instruction in English- 
         as-a-second language; financial and other 
         assistance for higher education . . .; job 
         search assistance; community work experience; 
         employment skills training focused on a 
         specific job; and on-the-job training in an 
         employment setting. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 44:10-25(b).  The job training and education 
programs created by the FDP for New Jersey's AFDC recipients 
("FDP-JOBS") are intended to serve as New Jersey's education, 
employment and job training programs under 42 U.S.C. § 681.  SeeN.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 44:10-19 note. 
         To assist recipients in pursuing their educational and 
vocational goals, the FDP provides specific benefits, such as 
financial assistance for higher education (N.J. Stat. Ann. §  
44:10-25(f)), day care services (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 44:10- 
25(g)(1)), transportation services (N.J. Stat. Ann. § 44:10- 
25(g)(2)), and the extension of Medicaid benefits for up to two 
years for persons who "graduate" from the AFDC program as a 
result of increased earned income (N.J. Stat. Ann. §  44:10- 
25(g)(3)). 
         The provision challenged in this action is section 3.5 
of the chapter, an amendment to then-existing state law that 
eliminates the standard AFDC grant increase (e.g., $102 for a 
second child and $64 for a third child) for any child conceived 
by and born to an AFDC recipient.  In legislative findings and 
declarations accompanying the enactment of section 3.5, the New 
Jersey legislature declared that: 
         [t]he welfare system in this State should be 
         designed to promote family stability among 
         AFDC recipients by eliminating the incentive 
         to break up families created by AFDC program 
         regulations, which undermines the ability of 
         AFDC-enrolled mothers to achieve economic 
         self-sufficiency and thereby perpetuates 
         their dependence, and that of their children, 
         on welfare. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 44:10-3.7(c). 
         Briefly stated, after an initial ten-month grace period 
to provide notice to affected recipients, the FDP denies 
additional benefits to families receiving AFDC upon the birth of 
an additional child conceived while the family was receiving 
AFDC, N.J. Admin. Code tit. 10, § 82-1.11 (1996).  A family 
affected by the provision is entitled to retain a larger amount 
of earned income, permitting the family not only to offset the 
denial of additional benefits but to realize an overall increase 
in financial benefits through earnings.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
44:10-3.5 and -3.6. 
         Section 3.5 directly conflicts with existing federal 
law.  Even though the FDP was enacted as a permanent, statewide 
change to New Jersey's AFDC program, its implementation could not 
occur without the state losing its federal matching funds, absent 
a waiver from the Secretary of HHS.  Consequently, following the 
bills' passage, the New Jersey Commissioner of Human Services 
applied to HHS pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) for waivers of the 
conflicting provisions of the federal act. 
 
                 B.  THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD 
         The administrative record submitted by the federal 
appellees is important for resolution of the legal issues 
involved in the case.  Therefore, we will present the contents of 
the record in some detail, as did the district court. 
         In mid-May 1992, HHS Assistant Secretary for Children 
and Families Jo Anne B. Barnhart met with a coalition of welfare 
advocacy groups to receive their commentary on and objections to 
New Jersey's proposed waiver application.  App. at 41, 43.  
Following this meeting, on May 19, 1992, Melville D. Miller, 
President of Legal Services of New Jersey, Inc., submitted on 
behalf of his organization and 12 other advocacy groups a 
memorandum to Assistant Secretary Barnhart that detailed certain 
preliminary objections to New Jersey's AFDC waiver request.  App. 
at 43-68. 
         On June 5, 1992, DHS submitted its formal application 
to HHS for a waiver under section 1315(a) that would authorize, 
inter alia, the state's implementation of section 3.5 as well as 
the FDP-JOBS program as a five-year experimental project.  App. 
at 174.  The application included a proposal by the agency that 
described counterproductive results of current welfare policies 
and described how New Jersey's FDP would address these 
deficiencies with the goal of ultimately breaking the "cycle of 
poverty."  App. at 175-288.  While DHS conceded that depriving 
children of AFDC benefits might seem "harsh," it nevertheless 
justified section 3.5 by stating that its purpose was to 
encourage parents to be responsible in their decision to have 
additional children while receiving welfare.  App. at 183-85.  
Indeed, DHS explicitly described the choice to have a child while 
receiving public support as "irresponsible [and] not socially 
desirable."  App. at 183.  DHS stated that it would offer 
financial incentives to encourage AFDC parents with children born 
after section 3.5 became effective to offset the benefits they 
otherwise would have received through priority for employment and 
training services in FDP-JOBS and through the increase in the 
earned income disregard.  App. at 184-85. 
         On July 2, 1992, Assistant Secretary Barnhart submitted 
a memorandum to then-Secretary Louis Sullivan that formally 
recommended approval of New Jersey's waiver request.  App. at 40.  
Shortly thereafter, on July 9, 1992, the aforementioned advocacy 
groups sent a letter to Assistant Secretary Barnhart to 
supplement their earlier submission, predicated upon their 
"review of the final application submitted by the State, together 
with [their] review of the implementing regulations for the FDP 
as published in the New Jersey Register . . . ."  App. at 36.  In 
a reply letter dated August 7, 1992, Assistant Secretary Barnhart 
informed Legal Services of New Jersey that HHS had considered 
their supplemental objections but that the waiver still was 
granted, in part because the New Jersey program "represented a 
new and innovative approach aimed at promoting self-sufficiency 
and reducing long-term welfare dependency."  App. at 17. 
         On July 20, 1992, Secretary Sullivan approved the 
waiver to allow the entire FDP to be implemented as a five-year 
project under section 1315(a).  App. at 18-35.  The waiver 
allowed DHS to implement section 3.5 statewide commencing on 
October 1, 1992.  App. at 20-21.  Included among the terms and 
conditions of the waiver was the requirement that New Jersey 
conduct a demonstration project whereby families subject to the 
provisions of the FDP would be "randomly assigned to either a 
treatment group whose eligibility will be determined based on FDP 
provisions, or to a nontreatment (or control) group for whom 
eligibility will be determined based on existing program 
provisions."  App. at 21.  DHS was permitted to phase in FDP- 
JOBS, first in Essex, Hudson, and Camden counties, and then in 
the remaining 18 counties of the state according to a DHS- 
sponsored schedule, but "by no later than June 1995."  App. at 
22.  DHS adopted regulations to implement the FDP on September 
21, 1992.  24 N.J. Reg. 3352 (Sept. 21, 1992).  The regulations 
became operative on October 1, 1992, and provide that every child 
born after August 1, 1993, to a parent receiving AFDC for any 
month within the ten months preceding the birth of the child 
"shall be excluded from the eligible unit" and the parent "shall 
not be entitled to incrementally increased AFDC benefits as a 
result of the birth of a child(ren)."  N.J. Admin. Code tit. 10, 
§ 82-1.11(a).  The only exception to section 3.5's mandate is for 
the children of new AFDC applicants that are born within ten 
months of their families' application for benefits.  N.J. Admin. 
Code tit. 10, § 82-1.11(a)(2). 
 
         II.  VALIDITY OF THE HHS WAIVER UNDER THE APA 
         Appellants first challenge the district court's 
decision to uphold the Secretary's grant of the waiver to New 
Jersey under 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a).  Appellants claim that the 
Secretary's decision to grant the waiver violated the 
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") in two ways.  First, they 
claim that the Secretary failed to articulate or explain in the 
record how her decision complied with the statutory requirements 
of 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) and how it addressed the other statutory 
and constitutional issues raised during the administrative 
process.  Second, the appellants claim that the Secretary 
exceeded her authority under section 1315(a) by granting a waiver 
that is not likely to assist in promoting the objectives of AFDC, 
is imposed beyond the extent necessary to carry out the project, 
and is not a valid experimental project. 
         We note at the outset that a court, in reviewing 
informal agency action, "is not empowered to substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency."  Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 824 (1971).  
Nor will we presume even to comment upon the wisdom of New 
Jersey's effort at welfare reform.  Although our inquiry into the 
propriety of the Secretary's waiver here "is to be searching and 
careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one."  Id.  
Because we believe that this narrow standard of review forbids us 
to disturb the Secretary's decision, we will explain the standard 
of review in some detail. 
         The Supreme Court in Overton Park explained the 
contours of judicial review of informal agency action under the 
APA.  At issue in that case was the Secretary of Transportation's 
approval of plans to construct a federally-funded interstate 
highway through a city park located near the center of Memphis, 
Tennessee.  Two statutes prohibited the Secretary from 
authorizing the use of federal funds to finance the construction 
of highways through public parks absent findings that no 
"feasible and prudent" alternative route existed and that there 
has been "all possible planning to minimize harm" to the park.  
401 U.S. at 405, 91 S.Ct. at 818 (quoting the Department of 
Transportation Act of 1966, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f), and 
the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, 23 U.S.C. § 138).  The Court 
noted that these statutory provisions were "clear and specific 
directives" to the Secretary, operating as "plain and explicit 
bar[s] to the use of federal funds for construction of highways 
through parks--only the most unusual situations are exempted."  
Id. at 411, 91 S.Ct. at 821.  "Despite the clarity of the 
statutory language," id., the Secretary announced his approval of 
the highway project without providing any statement of factual 
findings:  "He did not indicate why he believed there were no 
feasible and prudent alternative routes or why design changes 
could not be made to reduce the harm to the park."  Id. at 408, 
91 S.Ct. at 819. 
         The Court held that such formal findings were not 
required.  "Undoubtedly, review of the Secretary's action is 
hampered by his failure to make such findings, but the absence of 
formal findings does not necessarily require that the case be 
remanded to the Secretary."  Id. at 417, 91 S.Ct. at 824.  The 
Court noted that "the Secretary's decision is entitled to a 
presumption of regularity," but cautioned that the APA 
nonetheless "require[s] the reviewing court to engage in a 
substantial inquiry."  Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415, 91 S.Ct. at 
823. 
         The parties do not challenge the district court's 
determination that here, as in Overton Park, this "substantial 
inquiry" is pursuant to APA "arbitrary or capricious" review:  
"[A]gency action must be set aside if the action was 'arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law' . . . ."  Id. at 414, 91 S.Ct. at 822 
(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).  The APA thus requires a finding 
that the actual choice made was neither arbitrary nor capricious.  
To make this finding, the court must confine its review to "the 
full administrative record that was before the Secretary at the 
time he made his decision," and "consider whether the decision 
was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether 
there has been a clear error of judgment."  Id. at 420, 416, 91 
S.Ct. at 825, 824. 
         The Supreme Court, subsequent to Overton Park, has made 
it clear that we must remand to the agency "[i]f the record 
before the agency does not support the agency action, if the 
agency has not considered all relevant factors, or if the 
reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the challenged agency 
action on the basis of the record before it."  Florida Power & 
Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 1607 
(1985); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 
U.S. 633, 654, 110 S.Ct. 2668, 2680 (1990).  "We will, however, 
uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path 
may reasonably be discerned."  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2867 
(1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
         The Court's jurisprudence in this area indicates that 
the terms of the enabling statute frame judicial review of 
informal agency action by (1) establishing the scope of the 
agency's authority, and (2) indicating what relevant factors the 
agency must consider in making its decision.  In this case, the 
Secretary is authorized to waive compliance with certain 
provisions of the Social Security Act "to the extent and for the 
period he [or she] finds necessary" to enable a state to carry 
out an AFDC demonstration project if, "in the judgment of the 
Secretary, [the project] is likely to assist in promoting the 
objectives" of the AFDC program.  42 U.S.C. § 1315(a). 
         Although here, as in Overton Park, there is "law to 
apply," 401 U.S. at 413, 91 S.Ct. at 822, these statutory 
requirements demand of the administrator far less than those at 
issue in Overton Park.  Whereas the administrator in Overton Parkwas 
prohibited from authorizing the construction of the highway 
through the park without first finding that no "feasible and 
prudent" alternative route existed and that there had been "all 
possible planning to minimize harm" to the park, id. at 405, 91 
S.Ct. at 818, the Secretary here was authorized to grant a waiver 
of compliance if she judged that the experiment was "likely to 
assist in promoting the objectives" of the AFDC program.  42 
U.S.C. § 1315(a).  As Chief Judge Friendly observed, writing for 
a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a case 
involving challenges to a section 1315(a) waiver: 
         [C]onsideration of these claims, like those 
         in [Overton Park], takes us into a type of 
         judicial review considerably more difficult 
         to define and exercise than traditional 
         review of administrative action.  We have 
         here no adversary hearing, no record, no 
         statement of the grounds for the Secretary's 
         action, except as these may be inferred from 
         the papers on which he acted . . . .  While 
         we shall follow the guidelines helpfully 
         stated in Overton, so far as applicable, we 
         find . . . merit . . . in the defendants' 
         position that, purely legal issues apart, it 
         is legitimate for an administrator to set a 
         lower threshold for persuasion when he is 
         asked to approve a program that is avowedly 
         experimental and has a fixed termination date 
         than a proposal, like that in Overton Park, 
         which is irreversible.  Moreover, Overton 
         Park dealt with a situation where an 
         administrator was required to make two highly 
         specific determinations on the basis of 
         explicit, legislatively prescribed 
         considerations, rather than reach an over-all 
         `judgment'.  In saying this we are not 
         insensitive to the impact these projects may 
         have on the lives of thousands of people, 
         many of whom are in `brutal need[.]' 
 
Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1103 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(citations and footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146, 
94 S.Ct. 900 (1974). 
         The court in Aguayo stated that "the only limitation 
imposed on the Secretary was that he must judge the project to be 
'likely to assist in promoting the objectives'" of AFDC, and so 
the central question before the court was "whether the Secretary 
had a rational basis" for making that determination.  Id. at 1105 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)).  Rejecting the contention that the 
administrative record was inadequate concerning many details of 
the challenged program, the court found that: 
         the material furnished by the State in 
         justifying the programs and applying for 
         approval adequately covered the policy, 
         budgetary and logistical essentials, and the 
         statute--speaking in terms of an otherwise 
         unfettered `judgment'--does not require that, 
         before the Secretary approves an experiment, 
         every i must be dotted and every t crossed. 
 
Id. at 1107.  The court concluded:  "We are satisfied that the 
materials before the Secretary sufficed for 'a consideration of 
the relevant factors' by him and that there was no 'clear error 
of judgment' on his part."  Id. at 1106 (quoting Overton Park, 
401 U.S. at 416, 91 S.Ct. at 824). 
         We find Aguayo persuasive, and agree generally with 
that court's statement of the proper standard of review of 
section 1315(a) waivers under the APA.  To resolve the 
appellants' APA challenges, the central question before us is 
whether the record disclosed that the Secretary rationally could 
have determined that (1) New Jersey's program was "likely to 
assist in promoting the objectives" of AFDC, and (2) it was 
necessary to waive compliance to the extent and for the period 
she did to enable New Jersey to carry out its experiment.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 1315(a).  If our review of the record satisfies us "that 
the materials before the Secretary sufficed for a consideration 
of the relevant factors by [her] and that there was no clear 
error of judgment on [her] part," then we may not disturb the 
Secretary's decision.  Aguayo, 473 F.2d at 1106 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
         Turning to the appellants' specific APA challenges 
here, the first contention is that the Secretary failed to 
articulate or explain her reasoning in granting the waiver over 
the objections of representatives of the appellants during the 
administrative process.  As explained above, however, the mere 
absence of formal findings is not a sufficient basis for reversal 
because the Secretary was not required under the APA or section 
1315(a) to make findings or to explain her decision to grant New 
Jersey's waiver request.  See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 409, 417, 
91 S.Ct. at 820, 824; see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV 
Corp., 496 U.S. at 654, 110 S.Ct. 2680 (suggesting that the APA, 
by directing a court to ensure that agency action is not 
arbitrary or capricious, functionally requires an agency to "take 
whatever steps it needs" to create a record sufficient to "enable 
the court to evaluate the agency's rationale at the time of 
decision").  Our review is limited to considering whether the 
Secretary's decision to grant the waiver was arbitrary or 
capricious, and we will reverse only "[i]f the record before the 
agency does not support the agency action, if the agency has not 
considered all relevant factors, or if [we] simply cannot 
evaluate the challenged agency action on the basis of the record 
before [us]."  Florida Power & Light Co., 470 U.S. at 744, 105 
S.Ct. at 1607. 
         We will consider next whether the Secretary rationally 
could have determined that the FDP was "likely to assist in 
promoting the objectives" of AFDC.  As the district court 
correctly noted, Title IV of the Social Security Act expressly 
provides that the purpose of the AFDC program is to "furnish 
financial assistance . . . to needy dependent children and 
[their] parents or relatives . . . to help maintain and 
strengthen family life . . . ."  42 U.S.C. § 601.  The statute 
identifies other objectives of the program to include the 
encouragement of "self-support and personal independence," and 
the promotion of "continuing parental care and protection" for 
underprivileged children.  Id. 
         The waiver request submitted by New Jersey delineates 
three primary goals of the FDP: (1) breaking the cycle of 
poverty; (2) enhancing the role of individual responsibility; and 
(3) strengthening and reuniting families.  App. at 179.  As the 
district court found, these aspirations, on their face, conform 
to the purposes of AFDC.  C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. at 1005.  
The district court relied upon the following material from the 
New Jersey waiver request to support its decision that section 
3.5, in particular, is consistent with the objectives of AFDC: 
         `[o]ne important way the FDP will encourage 
         decision making is to offer parents a choice 
         when they have another child while receiving 
         welfare.  A parent will not receive an AFDC 
         benefit increase to take into account an 
         additional child. 
 
         . . .  
 
         However, [the FDP] will offer a financial 
         incentive for these parents to work which 
         potentially will more than offset the benefit 
         they would have otherwise received.  This 
         incentive will equal the current federal 
         disregards plus the difference between the 
         disregards and 50 percent of the monthly 
         payment standard for financial assistance.  
         These cases will also receive priority for 
         employment and training services. 
 
         This may appear harsh, but it is based on the 
         same principle that applies to everyone else 
         in our society.  If a person is working and 
         has a baby, that person's salary is not 
         automatically increased.  Yet, that is 
         essentially what we are required to do under 
         [current] federal AFDC regulations.  We 
         believe that if a person is given a choice, 
         that person will do what is best for the 
         family which, in this case, is work.  We can 
         best help others by empowering them to help 
         themselves.  The children will continue to be 
         eligible for Medicaid and increased food 
         stamps.' 
Id.; see also app. at 184-85. 
         The district court found that the above statement 
regarding the benefits ceiling imposed upon AFDC recipients, 
along with the provision for the maintenance of Medicaid and food 
stamps benefits for the children, "clearly evince that the  
state's goals are congruous with § 601's stated purpose of 
enabling `parents [or] relatives to attain or retain capability 
for the maximum self-support and personal independence consistent  
with the maintenance of continuing parental care and 
protection.'"  C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. at 1005 (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 601).  The court further stated that it was patent from 
its examination of the documents generated by HHS that the 
Secretary had reviewed the state's submission regarding section 
3.5 and had judged it likely to promote at the very least the 
AFDC objective of parental self-sufficiency and autonomy.  Id.  
The court noted specifically that the terms and conditions 
appended to the Secretary's waiver included provisions for 
evaluation of the FDP to measure if and to what extent section 
3.5 aids AFDC recipients in "slaying their own personal welfare 
dragon."  Id. at 1005-06.  The court held that "the Secretary's 
judgment that the state's FDP is consistent with the objectives 
of AFDC was predicated on a consideration of the relevant factors 
and was not arbitrary or capricious."  Id. at 1006. 
         We agree with the district court's decision.  It seems 
to us that the stated purposes of the New Jersey program are 
likely to pursue the goals, in the aggregate, of AFDC.  The 
appellants, however, claim that the record as it presently exists 
does not enable us to determine whether the Secretary considered 
the broad range of issues surrounding the project.  We agree with 
the district court, however, that the record is satisfactory 
insofar as it would allow the Secretary to ascertain whether the 
program pursues the goals of AFDC. 
         In reaching this decision, we agree with the district 
court's analysis of prior cases on this issue.  Appellants attack 
the Secretary's decision for failing to address the specific 
objections raised by welfare advocacy groups during the 
administrative review process.  They argue that we should remand 
the action to the Secretary for additional consideration of those 
objections in light of Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 
1994), which found remand appropriate after determining that the 
record contained essentially no evidence to indicate that the 
Secretary ever took note of the plaintiffs' opposition, but for 
one "conclusory" letter to their counsel.  Id. at 1074.  However, 
we, like the district court, decline to find in Beno v. Shalala a 
rule that in all cases an administrative record is deficient and 
must be supplemented where it does not contain a specific 
recitation and refutation of objections submitted in opposition 
to a proposed section 1315(a) waiver.  See C.K. v. Shalala, 883 
F. Supp. at 1006.  Here, the record reflects that HHS officials 
had at least one meeting with the welfare advocacy groups to 
address their concerns about the waiver request.  App. at 43.  
The record also contains lengthy objections by the groups in 
opposition to the proposed waiver, in addition to many letters 
submitted by the general public, mostly in opposition to New 
Jersey's reform proposal. 
         We agree with the district court that, given the fact 
that prior to making her decision to grant the waiver the 
Secretary had before her extensive materials as to the purported 
harms the FDP might cause, precedent allows us to give the 
Secretary the benefit of the doubt and conclude that she did 
consider those objections in approving the waiver.  C.K. v. 
Shalala, 883 F. Supp. at 1007-08.  In this case, as in Aguayo, 
the Secretary had sufficient data, including information and 
arguments addressing all the pertinent issues, to consider the 
factors relevant to her decision.  Aguayo, 473 F.2d at 1106.  We 
will not assume that the Secretary ignored the materials 
presented in contravention of the state's position simply 
because, in the end, she was not persuaded by them.  Thus, we 
believe that the record as it stands is satisfactory insofar as 
it would allow the Secretary to ascertain whether the program 
pursues the goals of the AFDC, and that the Secretary did not 
exceed her authority under section 1315(a) in this regard. 
         However, the appellants also claim that the Secretary 
exceeded her authority under section 1315(a) by granting a waiver 
that was broader than necessary to carry out the project, and 
that is not a valid experimental project.  We will address these 
two claims in turn.  With respect to the first, the district 
court decided that approval of that portion of the FDP that 
permitted statewide application of section 3.5 while allowing a 
three-year phase-in for the enhanced JOBS program was within the 
Secretary's discretion.  Further, the court decided that it was 
not an abuse of discretion for the Secretary to allow New Jersey 
to execute the provision aimed at encouraging employment and 
treating AFDC families throughout the state equally with the 
working poor.  C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. at 1008.  The court 
therefore found that the Secretary's approval of waivers for New 
Jersey's FDP was not arbitrary and capricious and that there had 
been no violation of the APA.  Id. 
         In support of their claim that the scope of the waiver 
was unreasonably broad, appellants argue first that the 
Secretary's waiver authorized DHS to impose section 3.5 on every 
AFDC family across the state, except for 3,000 families randomly 
selected for a control group.  The waiver directed DHS to gather 
data to study section 3.5's effects on these 3,000 families and 
the 6,000 families placed into an experimental group.  Thus, 
appellants argue, HHS allowed the imposition of section 3.5 on 
virtually the entire statewide AFDC population of 143,000 
families, even though it did not require any research data from 
134,000 of them -- a waiver they claim was beyond the extent 
necessary to carry out the project. 
         Next, appellants argue that HHS failed to limit section 
3.5's applicability to the extent necessary for its 
implementation by approving it without any exceptions.  They note 
that the section makes no exceptions for those who become 
pregnant through rape, incest or failed contraception, or for 
those who decide against abortion for religious, ethical, or 
medical reasons.  Further, in their argument for terming section 
3.5 a "Child Exclusion," appellants claim that the section 
completely bars eligible children from receipt of AFDC: 
         [U]nder a family maximum, when the oldest 
         child in a large family becomes too old to 
         receive AFDC, the family continues to receive 
         the same level of benefits because the 
         younger children's grants have not been 
         totally rescinded.  Under the Child 
         Exclusion, however, when the oldest child 
         becomes too old to receive AFDC, those 
         benefits disappear; the excluded children 
         never receive benefits because their 
         eligibility has been completely eliminated.  
         Similarly, under the family maximum, if a 
         child in a large family is sent to live with 
         a relative, the child can receive AFDC 
         benefits because the child's eligibility was 
         never rescinded.  Dandridge [v. Williams], 
         397 U.S. 471, 480, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1159 
         (1970).  Under the Child Exclusion an 
         excluded child cannot receive benefits no 
         matter where he or she lives. 
Br. at 34. 
 
         The federal appellees argue that the broad language of 
section 1315(a) allows both the states and the Secretary wide 
discretion to conduct a variety of experiments and demonstration 
projects.  Br. at 24.  Thus, they claim that: 
         Although the Secretary certainly has the 
         authority to place limits on a proposed 
         waiver project, and could conceivably abuse 
         her discretion by approving a project of 
         truly excessive scope or duration, plaintiffs 
         lose sight of the proposition that neither 
         the states nor the Secretary may be held to 
         `standards of scientific precision' in the 
         design and scope of such projects. 
Br. at 24 (citation omitted).  With regard to section 3.5's 
applicability state-wide, the federal appellees claim that "the 
Secretary's broad § 1315 waiver authority by no means excludes 
the possibility of a `demonstration' conducted on a state-wide 
basis."  Id. at 25.  Regarding the appellants' claim that the 
waiver was excessively broad "simply because the Secretary did 
not impose exceptions to the plan's provisions that the State 
itself had not called for," br. at 26, the federal appellees 
state that: 
         This argument loses sight of the basic fact 
         that this was a demonstration project, geared 
         to assessing the efficacy of new approaches 
         to welfare issues.  While it may be that some 
         exceptions of the sort plaintiffs suggest 
         might eventually prove to be useful 
         refinements of the approach tested here, the 
         Secretary acted well within her discretion 
         under § 1315 in approving this pilot program, 
         as an initial test of these approaches, 
         without such exceptions. 
Id. at 26. 
         We are well aware of our proper deference to the 
Secretary with regard to the issuance of section 1315 waivers.  
However, that deference is not absolute.  We also have a duty to 
examine her actions to determine whether they were arbitrary or 
capricious within the meaning of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), 
and to examine whether: 
         the agency has relied on factors which 
         Congress has not intended it to consider, 
         entirely failed to consider an important 
         aspect of the problem, offered an explanation 
         for its decision that runs counter to the 
         evidence before the agency, or is so 
         implausible that it could not be ascribed to 
         a difference in view or the product of agency 
         expertise. 
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. at 2867. 
         An amicus group has brought it to our attention that, 
in reviewing subsequent waiver requests for provisions similar to 
New Jersey's section 3.5, HHS has required that states include 
exceptions that are absent from New Jersey's law.  See br. of 
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, et al. at 30-31 
n.25.  The amici claim that on October 12, 1995, Howard Rolston, 
Director of the Office of Planning, Research and Evaluation of 
HHS, wrote in response to Connecticut's waiver request: 
         Further, exceptions to the application of the 
         benefit cap have been required: when the 
         additional child was conceived as a result of 
         incest or sexual assault; for a child who 
         does not reside with his or her parent; and 
         for a child that was conceived in a month the 
         family was not receiving AFDC or during some 
         limited set period following receipt. 
Id. 
         Thus, it seems that the Secretary has required 
exceptions to provisions similar to New Jersey's section 3.5 in 
subsequent waivers under section 1315.  We, however, recognize 
that the Secretary, in her discretion, is allowed to change her 
mind over time regarding the wisdom of certain programs.  Indeed, 
experiments are supposed to demonstrate the failings or success 
of such programs.  Our conviction that the Secretary truly 
considered the objections presented to her by the appellants' 
representatives in the summer of 1992 thus remains unshaken.  
Accordingly, we agree with the position of the appellees that it 
is within the Secretary's discretion to determine the wisdom of 
welfare reform programs in a piecemeal fashion.  She need not 
have included the exceptions to the workings of New Jersey's 
provision that she later required of Connecticut's program and 
she legally is allowed to change her mind.  Our inquiry is 
limited to whether the Secretary's actions in defining the scope 
of New Jersey's waiver were arbitrary or capricious.  Since we 
cannot so conclude, we will affirm the decision of the district 
court that the waivers did not violate the APA. 
         The appellants' final APA-based argument is that 
section 3.5 is not a valid experimental project because it is not 
likely to yield useful information, and that the Secretary 
therefore acted arbitrarily or capriciously in authorizing it.  
Br. at 27.  The appellants rely on Beno v. Shalala for the 
proposition that "the Secretary must make some judgment that the 
project has a research or a demonstration value" -- that is, "she 
must determine that the project is likely to yield useful 
information or demonstrate a novel approach to program 
administration."  30 F.3d at 1069 (noting that "[a] simple 
benefits cut, which might save money, . . . would not satisfy 
this requirement").  Noting that the record includes no express 
finding on this point (which, as we have explained, does not 
necessarily require reversal), the appellants further assert that 
the Secretary reasonably could not have made the requisite 
determination with respect to section 3.5.  The appellants rely 
on studies, cited in the record, indicating no statistically 
significant relationship between AFDC grant size and family size, 
and fault the Secretary for granting the waiver in the absence of 
"any evidence demonstrating a likelihood that a comparison of 
[section 3.5's] treatment and control groups would provided 
useful information showing a correlation between AFDC benefit 
levels and family size."  Br. at 27-28. 
         We note first that, by its plain terms, section 1315(a) 
only requires the Secretary to determine that the proposed 
demonstration project is "likely to promote the objectives" of 
the AFDC.  Even assuming that the Secretary was required to make 
the more specific determination that section 3.5 was likely to 
yield useful information, however, we believe the record in this  
case would support such a determination.  Contrary to the 
appellants' assertions, the stated purpose of section 3.5 was not 
merely to lower fertility rates, but also: 
         to encourage families who have additional 
         children while on AFDC to take advantage of 
         the additional earned income disregard by 
         seeking employment to help cover the child's 
         financial needs.  It attempts to break the 
         cycle of welfare dependency as the only means 
         of acquiring financial resources. 
App. at 221.  The Secretary found that the goals of FDP included 
"break[ing] the cycle of poverty, [and] enhanc[ing] the role of 
individual responsibility."  App. at 40.  In her August 7, 1992 
letter to a representative of the appellants during review of the 
waiver proposal, Assistant Secretary Barnhart explained that: 
         the Department approved New Jersey's waiver 
         application . . . because it represented a 
         new and innovative approach aimed at 
         promoting self-sufficiency and reducing long- 
         term welfare dependency.  We will be able to 
         determine whether the project meets its goals 
         through the rigorous evaluation that is 
         required as part of the application's 
         approval. 
App. at 17.  The "rigorous evaluation" mandated by the Secretary 
requires New Jersey to evaluate the effects of the FDP not only 
on family structure -- including birth rates -- but also to 
evaluate whether "the FDP help[s] AFDC recipients to achieve 
self-sufficiency" and how "the FDP impact[s] AFDC, Food Stamp, 
and Medicaid participation and costs."  App. at 27 (listing 
specific outcome measures). 
         Thus, it is clear that the Secretary expected the FDP, 
including section 3.5, to yield useful information to enable her 
"to determine whether the project meets its goals."  App. at 17.  
We cannot say that this expectation, based on the record before 
the Secretary at the time of her decision, was unreasonable.  
Accordingly, even assuming that, prior to granting a section 
1315(a) waiver, the Secretary must "determine that the project is 
likely to yield useful information or demonstrate a novel 
approach to program administration,"  Beno, 30 F.3d at 1069, we 
cannot conclude that her decision to grant New Jersey's waiver 
request was either arbitrary or capricious. 
 
                   III.  STATUTORY ARGUMENTS 
    A.  THE HUMAN SUBJECTS PROTECTIONS OF 42 U.S.C. § 3515b 
         42 U.S.C. § 3515b contains safeguards for human 
subjects involved in research projects or experiments conducted 
with funds appropriated to HHS.  The statute provides in relevant 
part that no HHS appropriated funds: 
         shall be used to pay for any research program 
         or project or any program, project, or course 
         which is of an experimental nature, or any 
         other activity involving human participants, 
         which is determined by the Secretary or a 
         court of competent jurisdiction to present a 
         danger to the physical, mental, or emotional 
         well-being of a participant or subject of 
         such program, project, or course, without the 
         written, informed consent of each participant 
         or subject, or a participant's parents or 
         legal guardian, if such participant or 
         subject is under eighteen years of age.  The 
         Secretary shall adopt appropriate regulations 
         respecting this section. 
42 U.S.C. § 3515b.  The appellants contend, as they did in the 
district court, that section 3.5 presents a real and immediate 
danger to themselves and their dependent children because of the 
ceiling that it places on the AFDC funds that they receive.  They 
argue that the Secretary approved section 3.5 without first 
determining whether it presented a danger to the recipients and 
their dependents and, consequently, whether the program first 
required the informed consent of each recipient. 
         As the district court noted, the Secretary's position 
is that HHS's present human subject regulations generally exempt 
welfare experiments from review by an Institutional Review Board 
("IRB").  C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. at 1009.  These 
regulations, located at 45 C.F.R. Part 46, require that HHS 
research on human subjects must include (1) prior review of the 
project by an IRB, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.107-.115 (1995), and (2) 
informed consent, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116-.124.  Section 
46.101(b)(5)(i) specifically excludes from these safeguards 
research and demonstration projects designed for "public benefit 
or service programs," "procedures for obtaining benefits or 
services under those programs," and "possible changes in methods 
or levels of payment for benefits or services under those 
programs."  45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(5)(i).  Thus, the regulations 
provide that, as a general rule, a project that changes or alters 
the amount of benefits received will not present a danger such 
that the informed consent requirement is triggered, but they do 
not foreclose a finding of danger in a specific situation. 
         The Secretary argues that a waiver under 42 U.S.C. § 
1315 by its terms contemplates an estimation in advance of the 
danger(s) posed by a particular experimental project.  Comments 
published with HHS regulations promulgated in 1983 justify the 
general exemption for social welfare research as undertakings 
"fundamentally different" from the experiments otherwise within 
the ambit of the statute.  48 Fed. Reg. 9266 (1983).  Moreover, 
the Secretary asserts that the comments express the notion that 
benefits programs already are subjected to substantial state and 
federal review such that requiring an "additional layer of review 
for such projects [would be] duplicative and needlessly 
burdensome in light of the substantial review process to which 
they are already subjected by state and federal officials."  Id.at 9266. 
         It is clear to us that the Secretary's judgment that 
AFDC demonstration projects involving changes in benefit levels 
need no additional review represents a reasonable construction of 
a regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged with 
enforcement of that statute.  New Jersey's change in how it 
allocates AFDC benefits is exactly the kind of "changes in . . . 
levels of payment" addressed by the general exemption from IRB 
review under 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(5)(i).  However, we disagree 
with the district court's particular reasoning for holding that 
the Secretary complied with the human subjects research statute.  
That court found that "it is clear that [section 3.5] falls 
within that category of social programs insulated from additional 
review such that the Secretary's failure to comport with the 
dictates of § 3515b is not actionable."  C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. 
Supp. at 1009.  We do not agree with the district court that the 
Secretary need not comport with the dictates of section 3515b.  
In contrast, we believe that the "additional layer of review" 
from which HHS exempted public benefits experiments was the 
regulatory requirement of IRB review, not the statutory 
requirement of review for danger.  We do believe, however, that 
in the case of waivers under section 1315, the Secretary intended 
that her review for danger be subsumed within her more general 
review of the programs at issue.  As we are satisfied that the 
issue was presented to the Secretary by the appellants' 
representatives in their objections to New Jersey's plan, and are 
satisfied that the Secretary considered the issue in her review 
of the waiver, we will affirm the judgment of the district court 
on this point. 
         Appellants also have argued that section 3.5 
constitutes experimentation involving pregnant women and fetuses 
in contravention of HHS regulations that set forth additional 
protections for research, development, and other activities 
involving pregnant women, fetuses, or in vitro fertilization.  45 
C.F.R. § 46.201 et seq.  The district court, however, decided 
that section 3.5 "has no effect on the level of benefits received 
by a pregnant woman; moreover, the data to be garnered from the 
program and evaluated by HHS/DHS does not at all implicate issues 
and/or concerns regarding pregnant women and/or fetuses."  C.K. 
v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. at 1012.  The court therefore decided 
that section 3.5 is not directed toward, "nor will it measure," 
the effects on the pregnant or the unborn.  Id. 
         Appellants argue that section 3.5 "involves" pregnant 
women, which would trigger IRB review and the other protections 
required by Part 46.  They claim that the regulations indicate 
that pregnant women need not be the exclusive subjects of the 
experiment, but that experiments simply must "involve" pregnant 
women in order to trigger application of the regulations.  
Moreover, appellants are correct in noting that the 1983 
regulations adopted to exempt human experimentation that involves 
public benefits programs from the requirements of Part 46 
specifically do not apply to experimentation involving pregnant 
women, fetuses, or in vitro fertilization.  45 C.F.R. § 
46.101(i), n.1.  Thus, the exemption from IRB review discussed 
above does not apply to New Jersey's program if that program is 
decided to "involve" pregnant women or fetuses. 
         The question for us, then, is whether section 3.5 
involves pregnant women or fetuses within the meaning of 45 
C.F.R. Part 46.  More specifically, we must determine whether the 
Secretary considered the possible application of the regulations 
to New Jersey's program as part of her general review under 
section 1315 and ruled out their applicability, or whether she 
failed to consider the regulations' effects at all.  This 
question, of course, is distinct from whether statutory 
requirements can be waived, as it instead focuses on whether the 
alleged requirement is applicable in the first place. 
         Welfare advocacy groups did raise the possible 
applicability of the more general regulations applying to 
experimentation involving human research subjects in their 
objections to New Jersey's waiver application, although there is 
no specific reference in the administrative record to the 
possibility that the regulations aimed at experimentation 
involving pregnant women and fetuses might apply to New Jersey's 
program.  However, both the general regulations relating to 
experimentation with human research subjects and the specific 
regulations pertaining to pregnant women and fetuses appear in 45 
C.F.R. Part 46, the citation provided by the welfare advocacy 
groups in their objections to the waiver.  App. at 60. 
         Again, our standard of review requires that we give the 
Secretary the benefit of the doubt and that we assume she was 
familiar with the structure of the regulations issued by her own 
agency, particularly in light of the fact that welfare advocacy 
groups provided the citation for the more general regulations to 
her.  Thus, we find that the Secretary's consideration of the 
regulations pertaining specifically to experimentation involving 
pregnant women and fetuses was subsumed within her review under 
section 1315.  Furthermore, we defer to her implicit judgment 
that section 3.5 does not involve pregnant women or fetuses.  We 
determine, too, that we also would conclude in a review of the 
matter without deference to the Secretary that section 3.5 does 
not involve pregnant women or fetuses within the meaning of 45 
C.F.R. Part 46.  Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the 
district court on this point. 
 
                  B.  THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 
         Appellants also challenge section 3.5's validity based 
upon its asserted incompatibility with the Social Security Act. 
           1.  Assistance to all Eligible Individuals 
         Section 402 of Title IV of the Social Security Act 
requires that a state AFDC plan must: 
         provide that all individuals wishing to make 
         application for aid to families with 
         dependent children shall have [the] 
         opportunity to do so, and that aid to 
         families with dependent children shall . . . 
         be furnished with reasonable promptness to 
         all eligible individuals . . . .   
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10)(A).  The appellants claim that since 
section 3.5 is a state law that denies AFDC benefits to 
individual children who are eligible for AFDC under federal 
standards, it violates section 602(a)(10)(A). 
         The district court rejected the appellants' claim, 
stating that they had disregarded "one of the central tenets of 
the AFDC program, namely that `eligibility under the AFDC program 
has historically been premised upon the household as the basic 
unit of assistance.'"  C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. at 1010 
(citations omitted).  The court stated that where a household is 
receiving AFDC, all of the individuals within that household are 
receiving it, and that payments to one individual in a family  
generally are viewed as beneficial to the entire family.  Id.  
The court thereafter concluded that while appellants had referred 
to section 3.5 as the "Child Exclusion" throughout their papers, 
that appellation is inaccurate: 
         Under New Jersey's program, no child is 
         excluded from benefits; rather, the 
         additional child born to the AFDC recipient 
         household simply partakes of the assistance 
         already received by that household at the 
         same monetary level.  Thus, the Family Cap 
         here is analogous to the maximum family 
         payment upheld . . . by the Supreme Court in 
         Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 
         1153 (1970). 
Id.  The court analogized the New Jersey provision at issue in 
this case to that involved in Dandridge, stating that, like the 
maximum benefits payment in that case, section 3.5 imposes a 
benefits ceiling on the AFDC household.  Any additional child 
born while that AFDC family is receiving payments simply will be 
included in the assistance unit and share in the benefits 
accorded the rest of the household.  Thus, as in Dandridge, while 
the level of cash assistance flowing to the household will not 
increase with the birth of the additional child, the court found 
that it cannot be said that the additional child is denied 
benefits in toto.  Id.  Consequently, the district court held 
that there was no violation of section 602(a)(10)(A).  Id. at 
1010-11. 
         Appellants argue that, unlike a family maximum, section 
3.5 completely bars particular eligible children from receipt of 
AFDC.  They claim that under a family maximum, such as the 
program involved in Dandridge, when the oldest child in a large 
family becomes too old to receive AFDC, the family continues to 
receive the same level of benefits because the younger children's 
grants have not been rescinded totally.  Under section 3.5, 
however, appellants argue that when the oldest child becomes too 
old to receive AFDC, those benefits disappear; the excluded 
children never receive benefits because their eligibility has 
been eliminated completely.  Further, under the family maximum, 
appellants note, if a child in a large family is sent to live 
with a relative, the child can receive AFDC benefits because the 
child's eligibility never was rescinded.  Under section 3.5, 
however, they note that an "excluded child" cannot receive 
benefits no matter where he or she lives.  Br. at 34. 
         Earlier in this opinion, we noted that the Secretary 
has required of section 1315 waivers occurring subsequent to New 
Jersey's request that certain exceptions be made in provisions 
similar to section 3.5.  Of particular note here is the 
Secretary's requirement of an exception in the case of "a child 
who does not reside with his or her parent."  See br. of Puerto 
Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, et al. at 30-31 n.25; 
discussion supra.  As we held there, we note again that it is 
within the Secretary's discretion to determine the wisdom of 
welfare reform programs in a piecemeal fashion.  She need not 
have required the exceptions to New Jersey's program that she 
required of later programs.  Thus, we agree with the district 
court that the AFDC benefits unit should be viewed as the 
household, and that, in general, much like the family maximum at 
issue in Dandridge, New Jersey's provision therefore does not 
deprive otherwise eligible individuals of benefits in violation 
of section 602(a)(10)(A). 
         There is, however, undeniable tension between the 
Court's conclusion in Dandridge (that, "[s]o long as some aid is 
provided to all eligible families and all eligible children, the 
statute itself is not violated," 397 U.S. at 481, 90 S.Ct. at 
1159), and the potential operation of section 3.5 to deprive an 
otherwise eligible family with dependent children of any AFDC 
benefits -- rather than merely forcing the family to share a 
constant amount of benefits among more family members as in 
Dandridge.  If, for example, a caregiver does not qualify for 
additional AFDC benefits himself, and only the affected child 
lives with the caregiver, the otherwise "eligible" family of two 
would receive no AFDC money at all in apparent violation of 
section 602(a)(10)(A). 
         Despite this tension with the Court's language in 
Dandridge, the FDP does not violate section 602(a)(10) because 
the Secretary expressly waived compliance with section 602(a) 
generally in order to allow New Jersey to implement the FDP's 
method for determining the proper amount of assistance, which 
necessarily includes the possibility mentioned above that an 
eligible family will receive zero benefits. 
         In relevant part, the waiver provisions of the Social 
Security Act explicitly provide that "the Secretary may waive 
compliance with any of the requirements of section . . . 602 . . 
. of this title . . . to the extent . . . he [or she] finds 
necessary to enable [the State] . . . to carry out [its] 
project."  42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1).  Thus, compliance with section 
602(a)(10) is waivable.  Moreover, in granting New Jersey's 
waiver request, the Secretary explicitly waived compliance with 
section 602(a) to allow for "Differential Payments -- To allow 
the State to implement different methods for determining the 
amount of assistance for families in the FDP treatment group and 
the control group."  App. at 34.  An eligible family in the 
"control group" would be paid according to the standard AFDC 
program, and thus always would receive some benefits.  An 
otherwise eligible family subject to the FDP, by contrast, always 
will receive the standard amount less the incremental amount due 
for the affected child -- which may work out to be zero if the 
family unit includes no other eligible children, parent or 
caregiver.  Such "differential payments" are precisely what the 
Secretary permitted in her general waiver of the contrary 
portions of section 602(a). 
         The general section 602(a) waiver indicates the 
Secretary's intent to allow New Jersey to provide zero additional 
money for an affected child, even if that means that some family 
units may receive no AFDC money at all.  The appellants argue 
that the Secretary can waive compliance with section 602(a)(10), 
if at all, only by explicitly referencing subsection (10) because 
payment of benefits to eligible families is at the "heart" of 
AFDC.  But the differential payments are at the "heart" of 
section 3.5.  Although the Secretary could have cited each 
relevant subsection of section 602(a) specifically in the waiver 
authority document, such specificity was not necessary: the 
waiver provisions clearly indicate the Secretary's intent to 
waive compliance with subsection 602(a)(10) insofar as that 
provision is inconsistent with the zero-additional-benefits 
provisions of the FDP.  See Aguayo, 473 F.2d at 1108 (concluding, 
where it was clear that the Secretary intended to waive 
compliance with a particular section, that "[i]t would elevate 
form over substance to issue a temporary injunction against the 
operation of these projects until the Secretary went through the 
formality of adding [the section] to the list of sections 
compliance with which was being waived"). 
         In sum, we hold that the Secretary waived compliance 
with section 602(a)(10) insofar as to allow New Jersey to 
implement the FDP, and accordingly the program does not violate 
that section.  We will affirm this decision of the district 
court. 
              2.  Equitable Treatment Regulations 
         The appellants next assert that section 3.5 violates 
the principle that a state must treat eligible individuals and 
groups of residents on an equitable basis.  HHS regulations 
provide that "eligibility conditions" in a state plan "must not 
exclude individuals or groups on an arbitrary or unreasonable 
basis, and must not result in inequitable treatment of 
individuals or groups in [ ] light of the provisions and purposes 
of the public assistance titles of the Social Security Act."  45 
C.F.R. § 233.10(a)(1).  Appellants claim that additional children 
born to AFDC recipients are denied benefits under section 3.5 
based solely on what the state has deemed the "irresponsible" 
behavior of their parents.  The district court, however, held 
that the section "does not operate to deny any child benefits, 
but instead simply requires that child to share in the cash 
payments allotted to his or her particular AFDC household."  C.K. 
v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. at 1011. 
         Appellants also claim that while states are free to set 
their own standard of need, their "determination of need and 
amount of assistance for all applicants and recipients [must] be 
made on an objective and equitable basis."  45 C.F.R. § 
233.20(a)(1).  They argue that section 3.5 violates this 
regulation because it affords different levels of cash assistance 
to families of identical size and need based upon a parent's 
decision to have a child while in receipt of AFDC.  Br. at 35.  
The district court found no violation of this regulation, holding 
that "[t]he cap applies equally to all AFDC recipients who decide 
to conceive and give birth to another child since it went into 
effect," C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. at 1011, and that "[t]he 
fact that there may be different levels of assistance given to 
families of equal size is potentially offset by the additional 
earned income disregards available to the affected families."  
Id. 
         We agree with the judgment of the district court that 
section 3.5 does not violate the HHS regulations regarding 
equitable treatment of aid recipients.  Therefore, we will affirm 
the decision of that court with regard to this argument. 
                   3.  Work-Related Programs 
         Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 681-87, states participating 
in the AFDC program must establish and operate a "job 
opportunities and basic skills program," or JOBS.  42 U.S.C. § 
682.  The services and activities of JOBS include educational 
activities, job skills training, job readiness activities to help 
prepare participants for work, job development and job placement, 
job searches, on-the-job training, work supplementation programs, 
and community work experience.  42 U.S.C. § 682(d)(1)(A).  In 
addition, a state also may offer post-secondary education in 
appropriate cases as well as such other education, training and 
employment as it may deem necessary.  42 U.S.C. § 682(d)(1)(B).  
The statute provides that, when assigning AFDC recipients to a 
JOBS program activity, a state must assure that "the conditions 
of participation are reasonable, taking into account in each case 
the proficiency of the participant and the child care and other 
supportive services needs of the participant."  42 U.S.C. § 
684(a)(4).  This requirement applies to "any work-related 
programs and activities under this part, and under any other 
work-related programs and activities authorized . . . under 
section 1315 of this title."  42 U.S.C. § 684(e).  Appellants 
claim that New Jersey here failed to assure the reasonableness of 
conditions of participation in FDP-JOBS by parents of children 
subject to section 3.5.  Their argument is that:  
         all parents of excluded children must 
         participate in FDP-JOBS whether or not the 
         conditions are `reasonable;' such parents 
         must participate whether or not they have the 
         capacity to work, are disabled, can find 
         work, have the ability and proficiency to 
         participate in FDP-JOBS, have a need for 
         child care and other supportive services in 
         order to work or participate in FDP-JOBS, or 
         have a need to remain home and care for a 
         newborn child. 
Br. at 37. 
         With respect to this claim of the appellants, we agree 
with the district court that section 684 establishes that the 
provision is intended to regulate job placement programs, but not 
changes in benefit levels or work incentives based upon the 
relaxation of earned income limits.  As the court stated, "[a] 
benefit cut, no matter what its purpose, is not a `program' or 
`activity' offered by the State to assure that needy families 
obtain education, training and employment."  C.K. v. Shalala, 883 
F. Supp. at 1012 (quoting Beno v. Shalala, 853 F. Supp. 1195,  
1215 (E.D. Cal. 1993)).  We agree with the district court's 
assessment of this issue and find no need to alter this part of 
its opinion. 
                  4.  Family Planning Services 
         Appellants claim that section 3.5 is a "family planning 
service" subject to section 402(a)(15) of the Social Security 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(15), which requires state AFDC programs 
to offer voluntary plans "for preventing or reducing the 
incidence of births out of wedlock and otherwise strengthening 
family life."  Section 3.5, they argue, is a compulsory family 
planning service since it seeks to deter pregnancy in all women 
who receive AFDC.  Thus, they argue that the section does not 
afford AFDC recipients the information and opportunity to make 
informed, voluntary family planning choices, but imposes a 
coercive family planning regime in violation of section 
602(a)(15).  Br. at 38. 
         The district court did not agree with the appellants' 
claims.  The court noted that section 602(a)(15), by its terms, 
is directed at requiring a state to provide birth control 
services to those AFDC recipients who seek them.  It stated that 
section 3.5, however, addresses the problem of "births out of 
wedlock" by adjusting benefit levels.  Thus, while some AFDC 
recipients may avail themselves of family planning services 
provided under section 602(a)(15) given the imposition of the 
cap, the court found that the cap itself cannot be construed as 
one of those services.  While not commenting on the district 
court's assessment of section 3.5 as addressing "births out of 
wedlock," we agree with the court's decision that New Jersey's 
provision is not a family planning service within the meaning of 
section 602(a)(15).  Thus, we will affirm this holding of that 
court. 
 
                 IV.  CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS 
         Finally, appellants argue that section 3.5 
impermissibly interferes with their rights to due process and 
equal protection of the laws.  They argue that the cap is 
irrational and illegitimate because it penalizes children for the 
behavior of their parents.  In addition, they assert that the 
section should be subjected to, and fails, strict scrutiny 
review, since the state's "overriding" purpose in enacting the 
section (deterring childbirth by welfare recipients) is an 
illegitimate goal sought to be realized by broad and overly 
intrusive means.  The district court decided that New Jersey's 
welfare cap is rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
purpose, in that the state's interests in giving AFDC recipients 
the same structure of incentives as working people, promoting 
individual responsibility, and strengthening and stabilizing the 
family unit are clearly legitimate.  C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. 
Supp. at 1013.  Further, the court decided that the case does not 
present a situation where New Jersey unduly has burdened the 
procreative choice of the plaintiff class, since section 3.5 "in 
no way conditions receipt of benefits upon plaintiffs' 
reproductive choices."  Id. at 1014.  Accordingly, the court 
found that section 3.5 does not infringe appellants' procreative 
rights.   
         We have nothing to add to the district court's opinion 
on this point except to observe that it would be remarkable to 
hold that a state's failure to subsidize a reproductive choice 
burdens that choice.  In short, there are no constitutional 
implications when the state does not pay a benefit to parents who 
have a child that it would not pay to parents who did not have a 
child.  Rather than burdening the procreative choice of the 
plaintiff class, section 3.5 is neutral with respect to that 
choice. 
         Lastly, the court found that New Jersey's welfare 
reform efforts are rationally related to the legitimate state 
interests of "altering the cycle of welfare dependency that it 
has determined AFDC engenders in its recipients as well as 
promoting individual responsibility and family stability."  Id.at 1015.  
We see no reason to disturb these holdings of the 
district court, and will therefore affirm its decision as 
described herein. 
 
                         V.  CONCLUSION 
         For all the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 
judgment of the district court. 
                                        
 
